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FREEDOM FROM UNCERTAINTY IN INCOME TAX
EXEMPTIONS*
Maurice Finkelsteint
XEMPTIONS from obligations to government are as old as
Scripture.1 It is not strange, therefore, that the public interest
· in humane government should dictate numerous exemptions
from the income tax levy, particularly when one considers that the
income tax has long ceased to be simply a revenue producing vehicle.
The regulation of inHation or de8ation, the control of corporate financial structures, the distribution of wealth, all these and many other
concern of government have entered into the formula of our income
tax laws.2 The selection of those who are to be benefited by the tax
exemption is, of course, made in the first instance by Congress. But
here, as elsewhere in law, the process of interpretation leaves ample
room for the expansion or contraction of the area of exemption.
Since the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment and the consequent Income Tax Law of 1913,3 there has been a series of exemptions
from the tax, which has varied but little through the years. Recently,
however, expansion of large commercial activities of exempt organiza-

E

"'- The writer is indebted to Rose Lader, Esq., of the New York Bar, for valuable aid in
the preparation of this paper.
t Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law; Counsel, Mortgage Commission of the State of New York, 1935-39; Chairman, New York City Rent Commission, 1948.Ed.
1 Leviticus 19:10; Deuteronomy 24:9; Mishna Terumoth 1.3, Danby's Tr., p. 52.
2 It is now well established that Congress may use the taxing power as a vehicle for
the promotion of general welfare provided only that the purpose of the particular act lies
within the power of Congress. This proposition was not always clear, and even after the
Head Money Cases [Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 5 S.Ct. 247 (1884)] doubts persisted.
The Supreme Court, in Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 57 S.Ct. 904 (1937), settled this
heretofore contentious problem. In that case, the Court, per Cardozo, J., said, at p. 640:
"Congress may spend money in aid of the 'general welfare.' Constitution, Art. I, section
8; United States 11. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65; Steward Machine Co. 11, Davis, .•• [301 U.S.
548, 57 S.Ct. 883 (1937)]. There have been great statesmen in our history who have stood
for other views. We will not resurrect the contest. It is now settled by decision. United
States 11. Butler, supra. The conception of the spending power advocated by Hamilton and
strongly reinforced by Story has prevailed over that of Madison, which has not been lacking
in adherents. Yet difficulties are left when the power is conceded. The line must still be
drawn between one welfare and another, between particular and general. Where this shall
be placed cannot be known through a formula in advance of the event. There is a middle
ground or certainly a penumbra in which discretion is at large. The discretion, however, is
not confided to the courts. The discretion belongs to Congress, unless the choice is clearly
wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of judgment."
See also Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 42 S.Ct. 453 (1922).
3 38 Stat. L. 166 (1913) Part 1.
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tions has posed both legal and economic problems to the Government,
which must sooner or later be squarely faced by both courts and legislature.
Several aids to an analysis of these problems can be found in the
history of our income tax law and its administration and judicial interpretation.
The Congressional Act of 19134 enumerated a number of exemptions from the income tax. 5 While these exemptions were more carefully delineated in subsequent acts and somewhat expanded in scope,
they, nevertheless, remain in essence and principle the same to the
present day. 6 Congress has said, in brief, that associations which are
in existence for the purpose of promoting the public interest without
gain to individual entrepreneurs-in a word, to do those things which
government itself might, could or should do-are exempt from the tax.
Naturally, the first problem is to determine which associations come
within the statutory definition of exculpated receivers of revenue. The
current statute lists nineteen categories of exempt associations. 7 The
common denominator of all these is the devotion of the enterprise to
a purpose involving either a general public advantage or at least a
benefit to a large membership; and, in addition thereto, the requirement that the income shall not enure to the benefit of any individual.
Clear though these standards may seem to be, they have not always
been easy to apply in practice. Decisions by courts, even by the Supreme Court of the United States, have been solicited both by the
Government and those claiming exemption under the statute. Ordinarily, tax laws, in spite of judicial statements to the contrary, are
Ibid.
Id. at 172: "Labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, ••• mutual savings
banks • • ., fraternal beneficial societies, orders, or associations operating under the lodge
system for the exclusive benefit of the members of a fraternity itself operating under the lodge
system, and providing for the payment of life, sick, accident, and other benefits to the
members of such societies, orders, or associations and dependents of such members, ••• domestic
building and loan associations, cemetery companies, organized and operating exclusively for
the mutual benefit of their members, ••• corporation or association organized and operated
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific or educational purposes, no part of the net
income of which enures to the benefit of any private stockholder or individual, ••• business
leagues, ••• chambers of commerce or boards of trade, not organized for profit and no part
of the net income of which enures to the benefit of the private stockholder or individual; •••
any civic league or organization not organized for profit, but operated exclusively for the
promotion of social welfare."
. s I.R.C. §101.
7Ibid.
4

•

5
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construed, where doubts exist, in favor of the Government;8 but in
this field the Supreme Court has said that "the exemption of income
devoted to charity ... were begotten from motives of public policy,
and are not to be narrowly construed."9 And in one of the circuits, the
court pointed out that "under this law, in view of the fact that bequests
for public purposes operate in aid of good government and perform
by private means what ultimately would fall upon the public, exemption from taxation is not so much a matter of grace or favor as rather
an act of public justice."10
These criteria of interpretation have nevertheless not eliminated
difficulties in practical application. The mere fact, for example, that
the profits of an association do not enure to the benefit of any individual is not sufficient by itself to exclude the organization from the
tax under the statute. Thus, the Supreme Court of the United States
has denied exemption to the Better Business Bureau of Washington,
D.C.,11 under the Social Security Act,1 2 although none of its profits
enured to the benefit of any individual but its function was to teach
business men how to increase their profits by the utilization of ethical
standards and scientific methods. Again, in the matter of social clubs
where individual profit is likewise absent, and which are in the main
exempted under the statute,1 3 conllicts of opinion between the circuits
have appeared. Sometimes, it is held that where the social club, ordinarily exempt from tax, derives profit either from business or the sale
of its property or from fees received from non-members, such income
is nevertheless subject to tax. 14 In other cases, the exemption has been
allowed to stand in spite of such revenues. 15 In the second circuit, the
court has noted a more narrow interpretation of the exemptions in
favor of clubs organized for social or pleasure purposes than other exs The expressed opinion of the Court can be found in: Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151
at 153, 38 S.Ct. 53 (1917); Hecht v. Malley, 265 U.S. 144 at 156, 44 S.Ct. 462 (1924).
But in practice, the Government is usually favored. See Finkelstein, "Corporate Entity and
the Income Tax,'' 44 YALE L. J. 436 at 449-450 (1935).
9 Helvering v. Bliss, 293 U.S. 144 at 150-151, 55 S.Ct. 17 (1934).
10 Harrison v. Barker Annuity Fund, (C.C.A. 7th, 1937) 90 F. (2d) 286 at 288.
11 Better Business Bureau of Washington, D.C. v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 66
S.Ct. 112 (1945).
12 Social Security Act, §81 l(b)(8), 42 U.S.C.A. 409(8). The language of this section
is practically identical with the exemption from the income tax in I.R.C. §101(6).
13 See I.R.C. §101(9).
14 Aviation Club of Utah v. Comr. of Internal Revenue, (C.C.A. 10th, 1947) 162 F.
(2d) 984.
15 Scofield v. Corpus Christi Golf & Country Club, (C.C.A. 5th, 1942) 127 F. (2d)
452; Coeur D'Alene Country Club v. Viley, (D.C. Idaho, 1946) 64 F. Supp. 540.
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emptions listed in the statute.16 These are cases in which the courts
have divided on the precise meaning of the phrase ''benefit to an
individual."
Even where there clearly is no benefit to an individual on any
interpretation of the facts, there is sometimes a doubt as to whether
the purpose of an organization is within the class exempted by the
statute. Thus, the Circuit Court in the Second Circuit was of the
opinion that a corporation organized primarily for the maintenance
at high sportsmanlike level of the sport of dog shows and field trials
is not an association organized for scientific purposes;17 and cemetery
corporations, likewise specifically exempt under the statute,18 are from
time to time denied exemption where the profits from the sale of cemetery plots are not entirely used for cemetery purposes.19
We have not, however, in this country, as strictly as have the
English courts, attempted, in applying the statute, to weigh the social
advantage of the particular public interest sought to be promoted.20
In England, for example, the Anti-Vivisection Society was denied exemption from income tax because the court thought its purpose was
anti-social rather than in the public interest and that the achievement
of its goal would probably hinder scientific progress. 21
The problems enumerated above are, however, of comparatively
minor importance in the application of the tax exemption features of
16 "We have construed statutory exemptions somewhat narrowly in the case of social
clubs and have treated income derived by them from outside sources, if considerable in
amount and recurrent, as destroying the exemption." Per A.N. Hand, J., in Bohemian
Gymnastic Assn. Sokol of City of N.Y. v. Higgins, (C.C.A. 2d, 1945) 147 F. (2d) 774 at
777; see also, Jockey Club v. Helvering, (C.C.A. 2d, 1945) 76 F. (2d) 597; West Side
Tennis Club v. Comr. of Internal Revenue, (C.C.A. 2d, 1940) 111 F. (2d) 6. But where
the club makes a profit from a single commercial transaction, it does not thereby lose its
exemption. Santee Club v. White, (C.C.A. 1st, 1936) 87 F. (2d) 5.
11 American Kennel Club v. Hoey, (C.C.A. 2d, 1945) 148 F. (2d) 920.
1s I.R.C. §101(5).
19 I.R.C. §101(5); West Laurel Hill Cemetery Co. v. Rothensies, (C.C.A. 3d, 1943)
139 F. (2d) 50; cf. Comr. of Internal Revenue v. Kensico Cemetery, (C.C.A. 2d, 1938)
96 F. (2d) 594.
20 The English courts removed from the orbit of administration the power to determine
whether a given purpose is within the statutory exemption. Trustees of Sir Howell Jones
Williams Trusts v. Inland Revenue Comrs., [1945] 2 All E.R. 236; Inland Revenue Comrs.
v. National Anti-Vivisection Society, [1945] 2 All E.R. 529; The Corporation of Foreign
Bondholders v. Inland Revenue Comrs., [1944] I All E.R. 420; Royal Choral Society v.
Comrs. of Inland Revenue, [1943] 2 All E.R. 101; The Trustees of Sir Harold A. Wernher's
Charitable Trust v. Inland Revenue Comrs., [1937] 2 All E.R. 488; Peterborough Royal Fox
Hound Show Society v. Comrs. of Inland Revenue, [1936] I All E.R. 813.
21 Inland Revenue Comrs. v. National Anti-Vivisection Society, [1945] 2 All E.R. 529;
but see contra, Pennsylvania Co. v. Helvering, (App. D.C. 1933) 66 F. (2d) 284.
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the statute. Of growing consequence· has been the recent increase in
commercial and profit producing enterprise of associations whose tax
exemption is clear from all doubt. Colleges, universities, churches and
other organizations whose tax exemption is specific have in recent
years entered into the :field of commerce, employing some of their
capital for the purpose of trade and manufacture in order to produce
profits to be used in carrying out the basic religious, educational or
charitable purposes of the several institutions.22 That this movement,
which has recently attracted public attention, is of the utmost significance to the economics of the nation is, of course, evident. Objections
to the tax exemptions23 have come from those who see in them a danger
to the economic welfare of the nation. 24 It is argued that the entry
of tax exempt institutions into business gives them an advantage over
their competitors if tax exemption is to be allowed to the enterprises
organized and operated by them. This advantage can derive from only
two possible sources: on the one hand, it is said that a tax exempt business is in a favorable position to compete, by way of lowering prices,
for the business in ·which it is engaged; and, on the other hand, not
being subject to income tax, such companies are in a better position to
accumulate large surpluses during good years with which to weather
the periodic crises of business.25
Here is presented a definitive challenge to legfalative and judicial
formulation of principles of tax exemption which requires most careful consideration and understanding if the fears of those who oppose
tax exemption are to be avoided.
The basis of the current judicial view that corporations organized
and operated by tax exempt associations are themselves free from the income tax under the statute is found in the decision of the Supreme Court
of the United States in Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores. 26
22 Some concept of the extent of this activity can be gleaned from a study conducted by
the New York Times. See article under by-line of Benjamin Fine, N.Y. TIMES, §l, p. 1
(Dec. 13, 1948).
23 These exemptions, as we shall see below, aie fairly established, at least in the Circuit
Courts.
24THE NAnoN, p. 414 (April 9, 1949); THE WALL STREET JoUBNAL, p. 1 (May 4,
1949); Heaiings before House Ways and Means Committee on Proposed Revisions of the Int.
Rev. Code, 80th Cong., 1st sess., pt. v, pp. 3560-1 (1948); see statement of Rep. Mason of
Illinois, reported in N.Y. TIMES §1, p. 65 (Nov. 27, 1949), estimating that fifty billion
dollars in annual revenue is subject to exemption under these provisions of the act.
25 Heaiings before House Ways and Means Committee on Proposed Revisions of the
Int. Rev. Code, 80th Cong., 1st sess., pt. v, p. 3527 (1948).
26 263 U.S. 578, 44 S.Ct. 204 (1924).
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An examination of the opinion in that case as well as of the briefs of
counsel, submitted to the Court, reveals, however, that nothing definitive on this subject was there decided or even claimed by the parties.
In that case, a corporation sole, whose purposes were clearly tax exempt, was met by a claim of the Treasury that its revenues were subject to taxation because a large part of them were derived from rents
of real property, dividends and interest on stocks and bonds in companies over which the religious association had no control, and from
an insubstantial revenue derived from the sale of wine, chocolate,
and other articles within the taxpayer's own organization.
Before the Supreme Court, the Treasury claimed that the statute
did not apply to any tax exempt association which to any extent derived
revenue from commerce because, as the Government claimed, it was
in that case not operated exclusively for religious purposes. The Government argued: "The inquiry therefore arises as to what is the test
by which we are to determine whether or not a particular association
or corporation is or was organized and operated exclusively for one
or more of the specified purposes. Is it the dominant purpose in the
use of the property or in the performance of the transactions? Or,
is it the expenditure of the income or profits for the purposes for which
the particular institution was organized or incorporated? We say the
former, regardless of how or for what purpose the revenue or profits
are expended or are to be expended. The respondent says the latter,
provided only that the revenue or profits are obtained by the association
or corporation from the use of its own property or by its own transactions."27
In support of its position, the Government pointed to a uniform
series of Treasury Department rulings and regulations holding that
the exemption does not apply to exempt corporations which receive
revenue from commercial enterprises.28 'We take it," they argued, "that
no one could claim that the United States Steel Corporation would
be changed to a charitable institution by devoting its entire profits to
charitable purposes."29
27 Government's Brief on the Merits, at p. 6.
2BTreas. Reg. 45 (1920 ed.) art. 517; Treas. Reg. 62 (1922 ed.) art. 517; O.D. 953,
1921-4 Cum. Bul. 261; Sol. Mem. 952, 1919-1 Cum. Bul. 207; O.D. 508, 1920-2 Cum.
Bul. 207; O.D. 60, 1919-1 Cum. Bul. 193. The reference to these administrative rulings
was urged upon the Court as a practical guide to statutory interpretation, under the rule
that the practical construction of a statute by those charged with carrying it into effect is
entitled to great weight. In support of this, the Government cited Schell's Executors v.
Fauche, 138 U.S. 562, 572, 11 S.Ct. 376 (1891); Maryland Casualty Co. v. United States,
251 U.S. 342, 349, 40 S.Ct. 135 (1920).
29 Petition and Brief on Application for Writ of Certiorari, p. 12.
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Interestingly enough, the respondent did not challenge the proposition that an exempt corporation which operated a business would thereby lose its exemption. All that was claimed by the respondent in that
case was that where a corporation, exempt from taxes, received revenues
from capital invested in commercial enterprises, it did not thereby lose
its exemption. It is pointed out by the respondent that
"The income from dividends does come, it is true, from commercial activities, in the broad sense of the term, but it has no
bearing in the present instance for the simple reason that the corporations that inure this income pay the income tax directly to
the Government, in conformity with the provisions of the law....
The mere circumstance of A being a stockholder does not mean
that he is a merchant; the most that can be granted is that he is
an owner....
"It would be a different pro_position if A had bought a sufficient
number of shares to control the business and in this way make
himself the manager of the company.... Then and under these
circumstances A could probably be called a businessman ...."30
In other words, all that the exempt corporation argued in that case
was that the ownership of commercial properties from which it derived
income and the insubstantial revenues derived from the sale of wines
and chocolate within its organization did not affect its tax exempt
status. It was admitted by the respondent in that case that where the
corporation, operating a profitable enterprise, was under the control
and management of the tax exempt association, as distinguished from
mere ownership, it might very well lose its tax exemption. Nor did the
Supreme Court of the United States, in upholding the tax exemption
in that case, go much further. There is language in the opinion of
the Court, however, which has given color and basis to the subsequent
decisions in the circuit courts, granting exemption to business corporations organized and operated by tax exempt associations. Thus, the
Court said, referring to the statute:
"Two matters apparent on the face of the clause go far towards
settling its meaning. First, it recognizes that a corporation may
be organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable,
scientific, or educational purposes, and yet have a net income.
Next, it says nothing about the source of the income, but makes
the destination the ultimate test of exemption."31
This language, left by itself, might be broad enough to include the
30 Respondent's

31 Trinidad v.

Brief on the Merits, pp. 16-18.
Sagrada Orden de Predicadores, 263 U.S. 578 at 581, 44 S.Ct. 204 (1924).
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hypothetical case suggested in the petitioner's brief, to wit, the exemption of the United States Steel Corporation from tax if all of its profits
were devoted to a tax exempt purpose. But the Court found it necessary to add:
"As respects the transactions in wine, chocolate and other
articles, we think they do not amount to engaging in trade in any
proper sense of the term. It is not claimed that there is any selling
to the public or in competition with others. The articles are merely
bought and supplied for use within the plaintiff's own organization and agencies,-some of them for strictly religious use and the
others for uses which are purely incidental to the work which the
plaintiff is carrying on. That the transactions yield some profit is,
in the circumstances, a negligible factor. Financial gain is not
the end to which they are directed."32
In the context of the full opinion, it would seem that the declaration of the Court, that the source of the income was not the test,
did not imply that it was likewise immaterial whether or not the
exempt institution itself carried on and operated the business which
was the source of the income. To read into the statute an exemption
to business organizations actually carried on and operated by exempt
institutions, even though organized for that purpose, requires a further
extrapolation of the language of the Supreme Court. The opinion of
the Court, therefore, -leaves open the specific problem with respect to
a business corporation organized, owned and operated by a tax exempt
institution, and no definitive determination by the Supreme Court
in the Trinidad case was either asked or made on this question. Nevertheless, a whole series of decisions of recent vintage in the circuit
courts have laid down the proposition that where a business corporation
is organized and operated as a subsidiary of a tax exempt institution,
or for a tax exempt purpose, its income is exempt from the income tax
levy under section 101 of the Internal Revenue Act.33
Two subdivisions of section 101 are here involved. Subdivision 6
excludes from taxation "[c]orporations ... organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary or educational
purposes, or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no
·part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual. ..."34 And subdivision 14 exempts "[c]or32 Id.

at 582.

33Comr. of Internal Revenue v. Orton, (6th Cir. 1949) 173 F. (2d) 483; Debs Memorial Radio Fund v. Comr. of Internal Revenue, (C.C.A. 2d, 1945) 148 F; (2d) 948; Roche's
Beach, Inc. v. Comr. of Internal Revenue, (C.C.A. 2d, 1938) 96 F. (2d) 776.
34

I.R.C. §101(6). Italics added.

,
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porations organized for the exclusive purpose of holding title to property, collecting income therefrom, and turning over the entire amount
thereof, less expenses, to an organization which itself is exempt from
the tax...." A distinction, therefore, is drawn in the statute between
corporations which are organized and operated exclusively for exempt
purposes and corporations which are organized to own and hold title
to property, collect income and turn the "entire" income over to an
exempt corporation.
Nothing in the e:iq,ress language of the statute either includes or
excludes the judicial determination that a corporation, subsidiary to a
tax exempt organization, which engages in trade or operates a commercial venture is necessarily exempt under subdivision 6 or 14 even
if in fact it has been organized and is operated for the purpose of
devoting its profits to an exempt purpose. It has been recognized that
under section 101 (14) only corporations "owning and holding" property are exempt.35 And despite the statement by the Supreme Court
in the Trinidad case, supra, that section 101 ( 6) makes the destination
of income, and not its source, the controlling factor in determining
tax exemption, a study of that case, as we have seen above, reveals
that the proposition was not directly involved in the decision and that
it falls far short from holding that industrial companies, operated for
profit, -are exempt from the tax, even where such companies are
organized and operated for a tax exempt purpose.
Judge Learned Hand recognized, in a dissenting opinion,36 the
limitations of the decision in the Trinidad case in this respect and was
of the opinion that in spite of the language in the Trinidad case, in
which the destination of the income is said to be the test, at least as
far as subdivision 14 was concerned, the purpose of the statute was
to "tax all business income, however destined, unless the company was
not in business at all."37 Judge Learned Hand did, however, recognize the possibility that "an exempt corporation may go into business
not strictly germane to its charter powers without losing its exemption."38 But he indicated the opinion that there are several checks
upon this possibility. These, he listed as follows:
35 Gagne v. Hanover Water Works Co., (C.C.A. 1st, 1937) 92 F. (2d) 659; SunHerald Corporation v. Duggan, (C.C.A. 2d, 1934) 73 F. (2d) 298, cert. den., 294 U.S. 719,
55 S.Ct. 546 (1935).
36 See Roche's Beach, Inc. v. Comr. of Internal Revenue, (C.C.A. 2d, 1938) 96 F.
(2d) 776 at 779.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
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" ... first, the business must be small, if the corporation is to retain
its classification under its appropriate subdivision; second, in many
cases it will wince at exposing its funds to the hazards of business;
third, its charter will often forbid such excursions. But I believe
that when, however actuated, an exempt parent does resort to a
business subsidiary, any income so obtained becomes taxable." 30
The majority of the court, however, disagreed with Judge Learned
Hand and held that a corporation formed under the Stock Corporation
Law of the State of New York was exempt from the income tax although it was engaged in a competitive business since all of its stock
was held by, and the corporation itself was dedicated to, trustees for
the purpose of establishing a fund for the relief of destitute women
and children. 40 The court pointed out that the findings of fact established that the corporation was organized as a medium to collect income and devote the same to the charitable purpose, and departed
from earlier decisions of the court in which it was indicated that the
purpose, that is, whether charitable in nature or not, must necessarily
be found in the charter, holding that the charter is not the only source
from which the fact that the corporation was organized and operated
for an exempt purpose could be derived. Nor did the majority, then
or thereafter, in any way adopt the various limitations on the tax exemption set forth by Judge Hand in the passage from his. dissent
quoted above. 41
Subsequent decisions in the circuit courts have gone far to support
the views of the majority in the Roche's Beach case. In the same
circuit,42 for example, it was held that a radio station operated for
civic purposes was entitled to an exemption as a civic league under
subdivision 8 of section IO I of the Internal Revenue Code; and, more
recently, the Circuit Court in the Sixth Circuit43 reiterated this proposition of law and held that a corporation formed to sell pyrometric
cones for profit where the profit was being devoted to educational
purposes was exempt under section 101(6) of the Internal Revenue
Code.
While these cases, at least as far as the circuit courts are concerned,
establish the exemption of corporations engaging in industry or manufacture for profit, if they are organized for the exempt purpose and
39 Ibid.
40 Id. at
41 Ibid.

778.

42 Debs Memorial Radio Fund v. Comr. of Internal Revenue, (C.C.A. 2d, 1945) 148
F. (2d) 948.
43 Comr. of Internal Revenue v. Orton, (6th Cir. 1949) 173 F. (2d) 483.
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operated for a like purpose, nevertheless, it does not follow that the
mere ownership of all of the stock of a corporation by an exempt corporation will entitle the subsidiary to exemption. On the contrary,
it seems fairly clear that mere stock ownership without more will be
deemed insufficient to justify the exemption even under the extremely
liberal view of the majority in the Roche's Beach case.44 In order to
justify the exemption under the doctrine of that case and those which
have followed it, it is necessary to show that the corporation claiming
the exemption was itself "organized" for the exempt purpose.45 To be
sure, it is no longer necessary to find the organizing aim within the
four comers of the corporate charter. Other evidence demonstrating
the ·inextricable intertwining between the exempt corporation and its
trading subsidiary may be adduced and if present will be sufficient
to extend the exemption to the operating company.46 This proposition
answers in full the fears expressed by counsel for the Government in
the Trinidad case with respect to the hypothetical situation that the
United States Steel Corporation might claim exemption from income
tax if all of its profits were devoted to an exempt purpose. It would not
by that fact have become a corporation "organized" for an exempt
purpose. The decisions of the circuit courts which have established
the doctrine of the Roche's Beach case have likewise fixed this limitation thereon.
Under cover of the doctrine of law above expounded, an increasing number of commercial enterprises have already come under
the control and operation of tax exempt organizations, and there is
a great probability that this trend will continue to grow in the near
future.
Two problems, therefore, present themselves to government for
solution. On the one hand, there is the economic problem of whether
this trend constitutes a danger to the economic system which has been
built up in this country; and secondly, are the possibilities of its abuse
as a vehicle for tax avoidance sufficiently large to justify curtailment
of the exemption by statute or by the process of judicial "interpretation."
On the economic side it is argued by those supporting the tax
exemption that competition is but little affected thereby.47 The prices
44 (C.C.A. 2d, 1938) 96 F. (2d) 776.
411 Sun-Herald Corporation v. Duggan, (C.C.A. 2d, 1947) 160 F.
46 Ibid.
47 Cary, "Corporate Financing Through the Sale and Lease-Back

(2d) 475 at 476.

of Property: Business,
Tax, and Policy Considerations," 62 HAnv. L. R:Ev. 1 (1948). See especially, statement of
Mr. John Gerdes, referred to in note 79, at p. 37 of that article.
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of commodities are said to be fixed by the inexorable laws of supply and
demand and by the well known psychological fact that manufacturers
and traders in commodities will always sell for the best price obtainable. The income tax, being a levy on profits, is not, it is argued, an
element in the cost of production and hence will not affect the price
at which the sellers of commodities are willing to offer their wares to
the public.
Contrary views have been expressed by eminent authorities who
hold that while it is true that the income tax is not an element in the
cost of production, nevertheless, a manufacturer who knows that he
will not have to pay any income tax can afford to 6.x his prices at a
point where the profit would be smaller than that of his competitor
who must pay the income tax. 48 People do not engage in business,
it is argued, to gain less than a certain minimum profit or risk their
capital to the hazards of trade for insubstantial returns. Profit itself,
we are told, enters into the determination to undertake enterprises and
is an element in the determination of prices; and if such be the case,
it is obvious that a tax levy on profits would be an important element
in the consideration of the price structure, and the exemption from the
income tax would be a substantial benefit to a competitor.
Moreover, even if it is true that exemptions from income tax do not
react disadvantageously against the non-tax exempt enterprise, it is
nevertheless clear that the tax exemption enables the corporation to
accumulate surpluses more rapidly than its competitors and thus to
weather the lean years. Even here, however, the challenge to tax
exemption is not conclusive for it can well be pointed out that under
the highest rate of taxation a great many industries have nevertheless
accumulated huge surpluses with which to expand production and to
meet the onslaughts of possible depression. A more important and a
more conclusive answer has been the suggestion made by tax authorities interested in preserving the tax exemptions: that Congress might
equate the position of the tax paying and tax exempt corporations by
requiring the tax exempt corporations to distribute to its exempt purpose a portion of its profits, at least equal to the amount of tax it would
have paid had it not been exempt.49 Indeed, legislation looking to this
end has been recently introduced in Congress.50
Id. at pp. 29-30.
at p. 19, note 43.
50H.R. 2976, 81st Cong., 1st sess. (1949).

48

49 Id.
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The problem with respect to the utilization of this exemption as a
method of tax avoidance or, even more reprehensibly, tax evasion, is
likewise of first importance in the determination of future policies. A
recent investigation by a Senate Subcommittee revealed the utilization,
on a comparatively large scale, of the exemptions in section l Ol of the
Internal Revenue Code as an instrumentality for personal gain.51
Although the investigation was limited to but one case in which this
method of tax avoidance had been attempted, the facts brought to
light by the Senate Subcommittee should, no doubt, go a long way in
clarifying the application of the legal principles involved in tax exemption to specific cases. It has long ago been established by the Supreme
Court that mere adherence to the letter of the law in tax cases does
not in and of itself result in the tax benefits contemplated. A most
significant example of this is the development of the ''business purpose"
rule since the decision of the Supreme Court in Gregory v. Helvering.52
In that case, tax benefits were denied even though by an application of the strict letter of the statute it might well have been anticipated
that the benefits would accrue to the taxpayer. The doctrine pronounced
by Justice Holmes-that a line is drawn by the statute and everything
on one side of the line is taxable and everything on the other side is
non-taxable-has not been found workable in practice.53 At best, the
line must be gerrymandered to suit the general purposes of the law
and to eliminate possibilities of tax avoidance not contemplated by the
legislature. To paraphrase Justice Holmes himself, the right to exemption does not necessarily involve the right to avoid a tax, as long as the
Supreme Court sits. 54
We have not thus far, in this paper, considered the extent to which
the tax exemption enjoyed by commercial companies organized and
operated for the benefit of exempt institutions are a necessary incident
in the promotion of the public interest. It is clear that a comparatively
small segment of our industry has up to this time come into the hands
51 Report of a Sub-Committee of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
S.Rep. 101, 81st Cong., 1st sess. (1949). Investigation of Closing of the Nashua, N.H., Mills
and Operations of the Textron, Inc.
52 293 U.S. 465, 55 S.Ct. 17 (1935).
53Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U.S. 625 at 630, 36 S.Ct. 473 (1916).
54 See concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Graves v. New York, 306 U.S. 466,
490, 59 S.Ct. 595 (1939). To the famous dictum of Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v.
Maryland, 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 316 at 431 (1819): "the power to tax involves the power to
destroy," Justice Holmes added the gloss: "not ••• while this court sits." Panhandle Oil Co.
v. Mississippi, 277 U.S. 218 at 223, 48 S.Ct. 451 (1928).
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of tax exempt institutions,55 but the danger that this might increase
beyond control and might in fact be used as a method of perpetuating
control of industry in families by the use of the family foundation has
been adverted to. How extensive this movement might become and
how inimical, if at all, to the public interest it might ultimately be
considered has not been studied either in this paper, or, as far as the
author knows, elsewhere. It is interesting to note, however, that no
such principle obtains in England where the income tax law is a relatively ancient institution. While the English statute exempts from the
income tax hospitals, public schools, almshouses, or other charitable
organizations, profits from any trade carried on by such institutions are
exempt only if the profits are applied solely to the purpose of the
exempt organization and either: "(I) The trade is exercised in the
course of the actual carrying out of a primary purpose of the charity;
or (2) the work in connection with the trade is mainly carried on by
beneficiaries of the charity."56 Moreover, as we have seen, the English
courts treat as a legal question the determination of whether a particular purpose is charitable or educational, even with respect to the exemption of income not derived from trade.57
The mere comparison, however, of the English legislative scheme,
as interpreted by its courts, and our own throws but little light on the
problem here under consideration. Presumably, the exemptions from
the income tax are here dictated by the necessity of encouraging private
funds to enter into the field of social welfare and religious and educational progress. One would need to compare the extent of government
participation in these matters in England with our own governmental
efforts in those directions in order to form a judgment as to whether
tax exemption, as a matter of governmental policy, is more important
here than in England. In a sense, exempt corporations engaging in
charitable and educational pursuits, and to some extent in religious
activities, are doing the work of government and to tax them would be
analogous to the taxation of government for the support of governmental functions. And while the Supreme Court has eliminated the
bar to taxaticm of the salaries of public officials58 -a bar which was
55 It has been estimated that the activities of tax exempt corporations engaging in business cost the Government about $50,000,000 a year in taxes. No precise information, however, along these lines is available. The estimate referred to was made by Kenneth Fiester,
editor of Textile Labor, published by the Textile Workers' Union of America, and is contained in the article published in THB NATION, p. 414 (April 9, 1949).
56 Finance Act of 1921; Halsbury Statutes of England, p. 629.
57 Supra, note 20.
58 Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 58 S.Ct. 969 (1938); Graves v. New York,
306 U.S. 466, 59 S.Ct. 595 (1939). See also, illuminating historical and analytic discussion
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based upon the implied limitation of the trucing power of government
for the support of government-nevertheless, the taxation of exempt
corporations presents a more difficult and less easily disposed of problem; for it may well he that the rise in the rates of our income tax
might put a prohibitive burden upon the many thousands of institutions
devoted to the public welfare which are now enjoying tax exemption.
In any event, no suggestion from any responsible quarter has in
this country been made, that tax exemption in this field he eliminated.
On the contrary, the subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, which conducted the investigation into
the operations of the Textron Trusts specifically stated that:
"Section 101(6) of the Internal Revenue Code provides,
generally, that a foundation which is organized and operated
exclusivelr for charitable, educational, and other designated purposes shal he exempt from Federal taxation upon its income.
''We feel that this provision of law is a fair one. A bona fide
religious, charitable, or educational foundation which is operated
exclusively for such purposes is properly exempt from such taxation."59
The only suggestion made by the subcommittee was that section
162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code he amended so that its benefits
will he lost to a trust unless 85% of its gross income is actually paid in
the taxable year to the beneficiary, and the subcommittee added that:
" ... such an amendment would not affect bona fide educational,
charitable, and religious foundations which are in any event given
total exemption under section 10 I ( 6) of the code."60
Until the Supreme Court speaks, or Congress further legislates,
there will, of course, he no definitive determination of the issues involved in the exemption of companies organized and operating in
industry which are owned by exempt organizations. Nor is the situation helped by 'the non-acquiescence of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
in tax court decisions and their failure even to seek certiorari in the
Supreme Court. 61 As time goes on, more complicated corporate strucin Boudin, "The Taxation of Government Instrumentalities," 22 GEo. L.

J.

I and 254

(1933 and 1934).
1m S. Rep. 101, 81st Cong., 1st sess., p. 19 (1949).
60 Id. at p. 20.
61 In the recent case of Comr. of Internal Revenue v. Orton, (6th Cir., 1949) 173 F.
(2d) 483, the Bureau filed a non-acquiescence to the tax court decision, but has thus far
failed to apply for certiorari to the Supreme Court from the decision in that case in the circuit
court, as it failed to do in Roche's Beach, Inc. v. Comr. of Internal Revenue [(C.C.A. 2d, 1938)
96 F. (2d) 776] and Debs Memorial Radio Fund v. Comr. of Internal Revenue [(C.C.A.
2d, 1945) 148 F. (2d) 948].
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tures are involved in the dispute. For example, in recent years, a
number of foundations or tax exempt corporations have been organized
to purchase going business concerns and operate them for the benefit
of a tax exempt institution. Frequently, in such cases, a portion of the
revenues are employed in making payments, either on account of
money borrowed for the purchase, or directly to the purchaser, of all
or a portion of the unpaid purchase price. Here, new problems are
presented for administrative as well as judicial review. There can be
but little doubt that what is being done falls well within the exemption
as set forth in the decisions by the courts of appeal in the various
circuits above referred to. 62 But whether this new development should
be seized upon as an opportunity to re-examine the whole fabric of the
law of the tax exemption of such companies will not be decided by the
mere filing of non-acquiescence by the Bureau. An opportunity should
be presented to the Supreme Court definitively to settle the law in this
respect; and if this is not done, then Congress itself will be obliged to
pass clarifying amendments. A trend in our economic life which has
begun to take on the proportions to which we have referred is entitled
to that freedom from uncertainty as to its tax status which will make
possible intelligent planning for the future.
Relying upon the several decisions in the circuit courts, substantial
sums have been invested by tax exempt institutions in commercial and
industrial endeavor. It is obviously unfair that determination of the
tax status should remain long in doubt ·under these circumstances,
particularly when one has in mind the slender reed in the language of
the Trinidad case63 upon which the decisions of the Circuit Court have
been made to rest. Nor is it helpful that the regulations of the Bureau
continue to deny exemptions which the Circuit Courts upheld. 64 Due
regard for the importance of certainty in this field necessarily requires
final clarification of the problems here discussed.
62 Supra,

note 33.
aa 263 U.S. 578, 44 S.Ct. 204 (1924).
.
64 In spite of the decision of the Trinidad case, and the various decisions of the circuit
courts, which the Bureau has not sought to review in the Supreme Court, the regulations still
provide as follows:
·
"Since a corporation to be exempt under section 101(6) must be organized and
operated exclusively for one or more of the specified purposes, an organization which
has certain religious purposes and which also manufactures and sells articles to the
public for profit, is not exempt under section 101(6) even though its property is
held in common and its profits do not inure to the benefit of individual members of
the organization." Treas. Reg. 111, §29.101(6)-1.

